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The "Divergent Beliefs" Hypothesis 
And The "Contract Zone" In 
Final Offer Arbitration
By Robbin Herring1 
European University Institute 
Via dei Roccettini 9 
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Florence, Italy
e-mail:Herring@datacomm.iue.if
This paper presents a model of final offer arbitration 
which allows one to consider the consequences of the direct 
costs of arbitration on final offers, something that has been 
neglected in the literature. Another, and more important 
advantage of the model of this paper is that it fully 
characterises the set of equilibrium offers and describes a class 
of cases for which the set of equilibria can consist of both 
agreement and disagreement equilibria. This shows that the 
concepts of a 'positive' and 'negative' contract zones are not 
mutually exclusive, as is generally presumed in the literature. 
This insight has important consequences both for the debate of 
whether a positive contract zone is sufficient for agents to 
agree and for most empirical arguments based on this 
assumption.
Since the model is driven by divergent beliefs about the 
true beliefs of the arbitrator the question of when and whether 
agents have divergent beliefs is of some importance. This 
paper thus uses the opportunity to partially reevaluate the 
debate on the divergent expectations hypothesis (and the 
evidence supporting it) in the light of the model of this paper.
























































































































































































During the 60's and 70's a debate evolved in the US concerning the 
relative merits of compulsory arbitration and the ideal form it should take1. 
This debate both was encouraged by and encouraged legislation on compulsory 
arbitration in many US states. The two arbitration schemes which received 
most attention were 'conventional arbitration' in which the arbitrator chooses 
any weighted average of the final offers and 'final offer arbitration' in which 
the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the final offers.
Despite the significant costs of arbitration a large number of disputes 
have to be settled every year by way of arbitration (see for example the table 
in Ashenfelter and Currie [1990]). Most answers to this puzzle emphasise risk 
aversion. However, some authors also indicated that divergent beliefs about 
the preferences of an arbitrator may be of importance. Relatively few attempts 
to model and asses this idea formally have however been made1 2. This paper 
proposes a model of final offer arbitration, driven by divergent beliefs, which 
leads to new insights concerning the divergent expectations hypothesis and 
concerning agreement and disagreement in arbitration models more generally.
The by now standard model of final offer arbitration is due to Farber 
[1980]. He assumes that the bargaining parties at some stage decide to call in 
an arbitrator. They then deliver sealed offers to the arbitrator who selects the 
offer closest to his or her ideal settlement. This ideal settlement is not known
1 It seems that final offer arbitration schemes were already used long before 
the 60's -see Treble [1986]. For a review of final offer arbitration schemes see 
Metcalf and Milnor [1992].
2 Farber and Katz [1979] seem to have been the first ones to propose this idea 
in the arbitration literature. The idea that divergent expectations may be 
important in bargaining was however already put forward by Hicks [1963] 
who stated that:
"The majority of strikes are doubtless the result of faulty 
negotiation. If there is considerable divergence in opinion between 
the employer and the union representative [about the strike 
outcome]... then the union may refuse to go below a certain level ... 
and the employer may refuse to concede it. ... Under such 
circumstances, a deadlock is inevitable, and a strike will ensure; but 
it arises from the divergence of estimates and from no other cause.... 
Adequate knowledge will always make a settlement possible." 




























































































to the agents. The expected payoffs of the arbitration stage then define a range 
of offers which, if positive, describes the '(positive) contract zone1- the range 
of offers which are preferable to calling in the arbitrator. A positive contract 
zone is generally interpreted as implying agreement (i.e. no arbitrated 
solution). A negative range is referred to as a 'negative contract zone' and is 
interpreted as implying disagreement. In the Farber model a contract zone can 
be negative because one of the bargaining parties is too risk-loving. Babcock 
and Olson [1992] contains a straight forward extension of Farber's earlier 
model in which they allow agents to have subjective priors (i.e. divergent 
beliefs) about the arbitrator's ideal settlement.
This paper develops a model of final offer arbitration which differs 
from the models of Farber [1980] and Babcock and Olson [1992], Even though 
the model of this paper assumes the same sort of arbitrator as in the above 
models it differs from them in that the arbitrator is called in when the (final) 
offers at a certain stage are incompatible. The arbitrator then has to choose 
one of these (final) offers. Hence in this model agents are not expected to 
change their offers any more after entering the arbitration stage, that is, when 
going to arbitration the agents use exactly the same incompatible offers which 
forced them to go to arbitration.
This slightly different way of perceiving final offer arbitration has 
several important advantages. First, it allows one to consider the consequences 
of the direct costs of arbitration on the final offers. Although it is widely 
admitted that arbitration is expensive in terms of time, fees, etc., most3 
authors only consider such indirect costs as risk aversion about an arbitrator's 
ideal settlement. Second, the model of this paper not only characterises the set 
of equilibrium4 offers which are preferable to letting the arbitrator decide (a
3 A notable exception is Bloom [1981] were a "negotiate or arbitrate" (page 
236) decision is analysed. Farber [1980] contains an informal discussion of the 
likely effects of direct costs of arbitration.
4 An important caveat is in order here. The model is based on subjective 
beliefs about the arbitrator's preferences. Even though the authors in the 
literature refer to the resulting equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium, the 
underlying beliefs are arguably not Nash (at least as the terms is usually 
understood) since they are based on subjective beliefs. A detailled analysis and 
explanation of this issue is to be found in the Herring [1984] where it will be 
shown that the arbitration model of this paper can be couched in a two stage 




























































































positive contract zone) but also determines the set of equilibrium offers which 
imply that the arbitrator should decide (this situation is referred to in the 
literature as a 'negative' contract zone). Further, this model shows that for 
many beliefs about the arbitrator's true characteristics (i.e. the ideal settlement 
of the arbitrator) the set of equilibrium offers may contain offers which imply 
agreement and offers which imply disagreement (i.e. an arbitrated solution). 
This shows that the concepts of a 'positive' and 'negative' contract zone are not 
always mutually exclusive, as is generally believed in the arbitration literature 
(and as the name of a positive and negative contract zone suggests).
This insight has several important implications: it contributes to (and 
clarifies) a debate about whether the existence of a contract zone may be 
sufficient for agreement (see Bloom [1981] and Bloom and Cavanagh [1987]). 
Second, most tests of arbitration models are based on the presumption that 
disagreement can only occur if no positive contract zone exists (and that 
agreement occurs if a positive contract zone exists). In the context of this 
model this presumption can be wrong once agents are not assumed to have 
overly pessimistic expectations. Third, since models which claim to test for 
divergent expectations do so by assuming that divergent expectations can only 
exist once no positive contract zone exists, such tests may be completely 
misleading.
The model of this paper is primarily driven by differences in opinions 
or expectations about the arbitrator's preferences and by the direct costs of 
arbitration. Since the results of this model become strikingly different to those 
of the rest of the literature so long as expectations are not overly pessimistic, 
the question of whether and to what extend agents have divergent beliefs is of 
some importance. This paper will therefore use this opportunity to reevaluate 
the direct and indirect evidence on divergent expectations and the more 
theoretical claims that were made in this context.
The overall purpose of this paper is therefore as follows: to fully 
characterise the set of equilibrium offers and to describe situations in which 
the set of equilibria consists of both agreement and disagreement equilibria.
form subjective correlated equilibrium (see Forges [1986], Aumann [1974] 
and Fudenberg and Tirole [1991]). However, in order not to side-track 
attention from the main issues of this paper I will simple refer to the solution 




























































































These new insights are then used to reconsider a debate on whether the 
existence of a positive contract zone is sufficient for agents to agree and to 
asses what this implies for the empirical literature. Since the model is driven 
by divergent beliefs and since the results of this model become most striking 
(with respect to the remaining literature) once beliefs are divergent, the 
question of when and whether agents have divergent beliefs is of some 
importance. This paper will therefore attempt a réévaluation of the divergent 
expectations hypothesis and disagreement more generally.
Section 2 describes the model of final offer arbitration and characterises 
sets of solutions. In section 3 I will then go on to the debate of whether a 
positive contract zone is sufficient for agreement to occur. Section 4 then 
discusses the empirical and theoretical arguments that were made for and 
against the divergent expectations hypothesis. Section 5 concludes.
2. A Model of Final Offer Arbitration
Section 2.1 will describe the final offer arbitration model of this paper 
and section 2.2 will then give 'sufficient conditions' for several different 
equilibrium constellations to occur. The appendix contains a full 
characterisation of equilibrium.
2.1 A Model of Final Offer Arbitration
There are three players, the union (U), the firm (F) and the arbitrator. In the 
first stage U and F simultaneously announce their (final) offers. If these offers 
are incompatible then an arbitrator must choose one of the final offers. (Refer 
back to the introduction for an explanation of how this way of looking at 
arbitration differs from Farber [1980] and others). U and F choose their 
offers independently from the set C={Co,...,Ck}={l: l=0,l,2...,k} for some 
finite5 integer k. Say that the players U and F divide profit ji and an offer Cj 
by U or F is a suggestion that F gets Q and U gets Jt-Cj, that is Q is a
5 I assume a discrete strategy space which the arbitration literature does not 
do. This is not only a convenience assumption since a continuous strategy 
space in this model can lead to the non-existence of equilibrium due to 
discontinuities in the payoff function. Such non-existence problems do not 




























































































suggestion of what F (player 2) gets. I shall say that Q u and Cjf are the 
suggestion by U and F to play Q  and Cj respectively.
The arbitrator has an ideal settlement Ca and it is assumed that it is an 
element of the strategy space C, that is CXEC. The arbitrator uses a minimum 
distance rule which is to choose the final offer closest to his or her ideal 
settlement Ca. The case in which the final offers are equally far away from the 
arbitrator's ideal settlement is not commented on in the arbitration literature. I 
will make an arbitrary assumption, (to be referred to as the 'equal distance 
assumption'), that in this case the arbitrator tosses a coin. The arbitration rule 
then is:
A(a,Ciu,Cjf) = p(O,Ci“,q0Ci»+ (l-p(O,Ci“,Cj0)Cjf
where
=1 if |Cju-Ca|<|Cjf-Ca| 
p(Ca,Cia,Cjf) =V2 if |Ciu-CaHCjf-Ca|
=0 if |Ci>‘-Ca|>|Cjf-Ca|
This characterises the Arbitration stage. I assume, following Farber [1980] 
and the rest of the arbitration literature, that the bargaining agents do not 
know Ca. U and F believe that the arbitrator's ideal settlement is Cau and Caf 
respectively and for simplicity it will be assumed that Cau£ C  and CafE C . Cau 
and Caf need not be equal.
Payoffs in the final offer stage are defined as follows: If the offers of 
agents match, that is U offers F what F asked for, then U and F get the payoffs 
(jt-Ciu,Cif) corresponding to the offers (C ^Q f) respectively. If U offers F 
more than F demanded (that is U's and F's offers are (Cju,Cjf) respectively 
where i>j) then they get payoffs6 (jr-Cjf-y2(Cju-Cjf); Cjf+1/2(Cju-Cjf)). If offers 
match or if U offers F more than F demanded then the arbitrator is not called 
in to settle the dispute. The variable 5 denotes the discount rate of going to 
arbitration. A fixed cost would probably be more appropriate but would also 
require a little more notation and extra boundary conditions so that, for
6 One could also make the more general assumption that in this case U and F 




























































































simplicity, 1 decided to use a discount rate to model the cost and the delay 
associated with arbitration7.
Consider strategy combinations (Cju,Cjf). The expected payoffs of the 
union then take the following form for any fixed Q f:
Offers Expected payoff to U
Qu>Cjf Ji-Cjf-V2(Ciu-Cjf)
Q u=Cjf ji-Cjf
Q u<Cjf Ò(3t-Ciu) if i/2(Cia+Cjf)>Caa
Ciu<Cjf 0(ji-1/2(Ciu+Cjf)) if i/2(c ia+CjO=caa
Qu<Cjf Ò(jr-Cjf) if V2(Cia+Cjf)<Caa
Equally, for any strategy Q u, the expected payoffs of the firm are defined as 
follows
Offers Expected payoff to F
Q u>Qf Cjf+V2(Cia-CjO
Q “=Qf Qu
Ciu<Cjf 6Qf if V2(CiU+CjO<Caf
Q u<Qf 6V2(CiU+Cjf) if 1/2(c,u+cJo=caf
Cju<Cjf 6Ciu if 1/2(Ciu+Cjf)>Caf
Now note that the union, for any Q f, always prefers Q u=Cjf to Q u<Cjf, 
if 1/2(Ciu+Cjf)<Cau, and Ciu=Cjf to Q u>Cjf. Equally F, for any Q u, prefers 
Cju=Cjf to Q u<Cjf, if 1/2(Ciu+Cjf)>Caf ,and Q u=Cjf to Q u>Cjf. The remaining 
cases then define the set of (pure strategy) 'equilibrium'8 (final) offers for any 
Cau and Caf.
2.2 Sufficient conditions
Solving for equilibrium final offers is not difficult but a full solution is 
intricate and somewhat cumbersome. For this reason the explicit equilibrium 
conditions are relegated to the appendix. Fortunately, a number of simple and
7 Bloom [1981] speaks of "the direct cost of arbitration, e.g., time costs and 
attorneys fees." (page 235). Time costs are well represented by way of a 
discount rate, attorneys fees less so.
8 Please remember the caveat made in a previous footnote on the usage of the 




























































































straight forward sufficient (but often not necessary) conditions for agreement 
and disagreement to be equilibrium action can be given. Below I will describe 
simple conditions in which agreement and disagreement equilibria exist. This 
will then make it possible to describe several situations in which the set of 
equilibria contains both equilibria which imply agreement and equilibria 
which imply disagreement. In property 1 a simple sufficient (but not at all 
necessary) condition for agreement to be an equilibrium action is that beliefs 
are compatible:
Property 1: Sufficient conditions for for there to exist equilibrium (final) 
offers which imply agreement are that the expectations about the 
arbitrator's ideal settlement are compatible, that is Cau>Caf.
Proof: The proof of this property consists in constructing an equilibrium 
which implies agreement and which is based on these sufficient 
conditions.Consider offers (Cju*,Cif*)=(Cau,Cau) which imply payoffs 
(it-Ciu*,Cif*). The only way U could increase its expected payoff is by 
decreasing Q u; however since Cjf*=Cau this does not increase the U's 
expected payoff. Equally F cannot increase its expected payoff by 
increasing its offer since (Cju*aCar)- Hence (Cju*,Qf*)=(Cau,Cau) must be 
an equilibrium.
The question arises whether disagreement can be equilibrium action if 
beliefs are compatible. The answer is yes, since the parties can disagree when 
beliefs are identical, as a consequence of the particular equal distance 
assumption that was made above (see the example in section 3 below or refer 
to the appendix). One can however prove that disagreement can not be 
equilibrium action if beliefs are overly pessimistic, i.e. Cau > Caf:
Property 2: Disagreement (i.e. (Cju,Cjf), where Cj>Cj,) can not be
equilibrium action if Cau > Caf (i.e. agents are excessively pessimistic)
Proof: The proof will go through all possible cases in which disagreement 
equilibria can occur. For any pair (Qu#,Cjf#), where Q u#<Cjf#, to satisfy 
Q u#£{min C,£C: 20-q»<Q < C j»} 
and Cjf#£{max C,£C: 2Caf-C,a#>C|>Ci^}
it must be the case that Caf>Cau, for otherwise either the max or the min 




























































































reason is that it cannot be the case that (Cju#,Cjf#) satisfies both 
0 < i / 2(Cjf#+Ci“#) and V2(Q f#+Q u#)<Caf simultaneously unless Caf>Cau. 
The case in which the pair (Qu#,Cjf#) satisfies 
Ciu#E{QEC: Ci=2Cau-Cjf#> 
and Cj»E{QEC: Q=2Caf-C,a#} 
can only occur if Caf=Cau. The two remaining cases:
Cju#E{min C,EC: 2Caa-Cjf#<C,<CJf#} 
and Cjf#E{ CiEC: C|=20>f-Cja#} 
or Ciu#E{C|EC: C,=2Caa-Cj»} 
and Cj»E{max QEC: 2Caf-Cj“#>C|>Q“#}
also only have solutions if Caf>Cau (for the same reasons as above). This 
exhausts the possibilities in which a disagreement equilibria can exist.
This then indicates that in the cases in which beliefs are either identical 
or incompatible one cannot rule out that equilibrium final offers might imply 
to both agree and to disagree. However, disagreement, in the case of identical 
expectations, can be equilibrium action because of the particular equal 
distance assumption made. It therefore seems sensible to concentrate on the 
case of incompatible beliefs only. In property 3 I will give a simple set of 
sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for disagreement to be equilibrium 
action.
Property 3: A set of sufficient conditions for there to exist equilibrium offers 
(Q u*,Cjf*), where Q u*<Cjf* (i.e. the firm demands more than the union 
offers), are
Caf> max {(V6)Cau,6Cau+(l-6) jr}.
P r o o f : I will construct an equilibrium (Cju* ,C jf*) for which 
Cju*sCau<CafsCjf*. If CafsC jf* then there exists a Q u*E{min QEC: 
2Cau-Cjf*<C|<Cjf*} for which Q u*sCau since the sufficient condition 
requires that Cau<Caf. Equally if Q u*sCau then there exists a Q f*E{max 
C|EC: 2Caf-Cju*>C|>Cju*} for which CafsC jf* since the sufficient 
condition requires that Cau<Caf. It therefore follows that there exists a 
(Qu*,Qf*), where
Cju*E{ min C|EC: 20-Cjf*<C,<Cjf*} 
and Cjf*E{max QEC: 20>f-Qu*>q>Qa*}
for which Cju*<Cau<Cat<Cjf*. It remains to be shown that no player has 




























































































and that 6Cjf*aQ u*. The first of these conditions is satisfied because 
6(ji-Cju*)a 6(ji-Cau)>(jr-Caf)&(ji-Cjf*) due to the construction of the 
equilibrium and the sufficient condition. For the same reason it must be 
the case that SCjf*a6Caf>CauaCju*. Note that the sufficient condition 
also rules out the equal distance cases since the strategy space 
C={Co,...,Ck}={l :l=0,...,k} ensures that 6(n-Cju*)a8(ji-V2(Cj-iu+Cjf*)) 
and that 6Cjf*aV2(Ciu*+Cj+if) (both follow because CjfaCiu*+l), in the 
cases for which such Q .iu and Cj+if exist, that is, as long as Cj_iu£C  
Cj+if£C. This completes the proof.
As can be seen from the above condition max{(1/6)Cau,5Cau+(l-5)ji} 
decreases with 8 so that the higher the direct costs of arbitration the smaller 
the set of disagreement equilibria (at least as far as this sufficient condition is 
concerned). The opposite condition will of course result in the case of 
agreement equilibria. In the following property I will give a necessary and 
sufficient condition for agreement to be equilibrium action (in the case of 
incompatible beliefs).




Proof: For the firm to prefer Q, given Q u*, to any other choice it is required 
that Q u*2:6Cmf if there exists a Cmf such that Ciu’<Cmfs2C af-Cju-l; 
otherwise it must be the case that Q u*>8jt. It therefore follows that the 
firm prefers Q* to any other action if 
C|’amin{6j t ; [8/(l+6)](2Caf-l)}.
Note that since Caf > Cau it must be the case that Cmlla 1/2(Cili*+Cmf+l) 
since CmfaC|u*+l (should such Cmf and Cm+if=Cmf+l exist) so that the 
equal distance case does not apply. Equally for the union to prefer Q, 
given C|f*, to any other choice it is required that (ji-C|f*)>6(ji-Cnu) if 
there exists a Cnu such that C|f*>C„ua2Cau-Qf*+l; otherwise (;t-C|f*)28jt 
(that is and CnuaO). It follows that the union prefers Q* to any other 
choice if
C|*s max{(l-8)jr; [S(2Cau+l)+(l-8)ji]/(l+8)}.





























































































As above if Caf > Cau it must be the case that (jt-C„u)a(ji:-1/2(Cnu-l+C|f*)) 
since Cnu+ lsC |f* (should such Cnu and Cnu-1 exist). This once again 
implies that the equal distance case is of no importance in determining if 
something is an agreement equilibrium once it is assumed that Caf > Cau.
As can be seen from the above condition the number of agreement 
equilibria increases with the direct costs of arbitration. This is of course 
intuitive and similar to the analysis of indirect costs in the usual final offer 
arbitration models. Since the direct costs of arbitration are somewhat more 
tangible (and easier to trace) than the indirect costs due to risk aversion, the 
analysis of this paper makes a step in the direction of assessing the 
consequences of compulsory final offer arbitration.
Clearly, whenever the conditions of properties 3 and 4 are satisfies 
simultaneously then both agreement and disagreement may occur in 
equilibrium. Below I will describe sufficient conditions for two of the four 
cases in which this can occur. Property 5 describes a situation in which such 
strategic multiplicity can occur when neither of the parties has very extreme 
beliefs about the arbitrator. Property 6 will look at the opposite case in which 
both agents have extreme beliefs about the arbitrator's ideal settlement. The 
two remaining cases can be analysed in a similar way.
Property 5: Let beliefs be incompatible (i.e. Caf > Cau). Then if 
V2Jt a [0>f-V2]/(l+S) 
and V2Jt s  [Cau+'/2]/(l-6)
and >/2Jt > max{Cau; 6(jt-Cau)}+'/(2(l+6))
then both agreement and disagreement constitutes equilibrium action 
simultaneously (i.e. there exist multiply equilibria and some equilibria 
imply agreement and some imply disagreement)
Proof: Note first of all that if V2Jr a [Caf-V2]/(l+6) and if 
V2Jt s  [Cau+'/2]/(l-S) then 6ji a [6/(l+6)](2Caf-l) and 
(1-6)jt s  [6(2Cau+l)+(l-6)jt]/(l+S). It therefore follows from property 
4 that an agreement equilibrium exists if
[6/( 1 +S)](2Caf-1)+1 s [6(2Cau+1)+(1 -6)jr]/(l+6)
After manipulating this equation one then gets that 
k= Caf-Cau£ ('/26)[ (1-6)ji -1]




























































































k= 0 - 0  > max {((i-8)/a)0; 6(jt-Cau)}.
When combining these two equations and manipulating them a little one 
gets V2jt > max{0 ; d(ji-0 )}+V(2(l+6)) which completes the proof.
In order to see that these equations may allow a solution choose for example 
Jt=100000, 6=0.9 and (Caf,Cau)=(55000, 45000) which satisfies them. This 
example shows that discounting need not be very extreme for there to exist 
agreement and disagreement equilibria once neither the union nor the firm 
have very extreme beliefs about the arbitrator. As will be seen in the next 
property, once the the bargaining parties have extreme beliefs about the 
arbitrator then one requires rather extreme arbitration costs and delays for 
there to exit both agreement and disagreement equilibria. This is of course 
intuitive.
Property 6: Let beliefs be incompatible, i.e. Caf > Cau. Then if 
V2n s [Caf-V2]/(l+6) 
and V2Jc a [Cau+V2]/(l-6)
and 6 s  (V2)[l-Vn]
and Caf> max {(1/s)Cau,6Cau+(l-6)jt }
then both agreement and disagreement constitutes equilibrium action 
simultaneously (i.e. there exist multiply equilibria and some equilibria 
imply agreement and some imply disagreement)
Proof: Note first of all that if '/2it s  [Caf-V2]/(l+&) and if 
V2ji a [Cau+V2]/(l-6) then 6ji < [6/(l+6)](2Caf-l) and 
( l-6):r a [6(2Cau+l)+(l-6)n]/(l+6). It therefore follows from property 
4 that an agreement equilibrium exists if
bit +1 s  (1-6)ji, that is if 6 s  (V2)[l-Vjt]
Now from property 3 one knows that disagreement equilibria exist if 
Caf> max {(V6) 0 ,6 0 + ( l -6 ) j t  }. 
which completes the proof.
A simple example of this case is to let Jt=100, 6=0.4 and (Caf,Cau)=(jt, 0) 
which satisfies all of the required conditions and this for a large range of 




























































































3. The Contract Zone
A '(positive) contract zone', probably the central concept in the arbitration 
literature, describes the range of agreements that both parties prefer to final 
offer arbitration. In the above model the contract zone is described by the set 
of equilibria which imply agreement. The model of this paper however also 
characterises the set of equilibria which imply disagreement- that is that the 
agents proceed to the arbitrator. (A full characterisation of equilibrium is in 
the appendix). That this set is characterised is a great advantage of this paper 
since it sheds light on and clarifies a debate of whether a positive contract zone 
(i.e. a non-empty set of equilibria which imply agreement) is sufficient for 
agreement to occur (see in particular Bloom [1981] and Bloom and Cavanagh 
[1987]). This debate also underlies most of the empirical and experimental 
tests in the arbitration literature. In fact, it is almost always assumed that a 
positive contract zone implies that the bargaining parties do not invoke an 
arbitrator solution (See for example Farber and Bazerman [1989] and Babcock 
and Olsen [1992]).
That agents might not always agree when a contract zone exists was for 
example argued by Bloom and Cavanagh:
"... the existence of a contract zone is necessary, but not sufficient, for 
arbitration to lead to a voluntary settlement because there may be 
substantial direct costs of negotiation as well as uncertainty about 
settlement points within the contract zone..." (page 354)
Much lip service was paid to this point of view, which was first put forward 
by Bloom [1981]. However, probably because worries about common 
knowledge and coordination do not tend to carry much weight in equilibrium 
analysis, such doubts made little difference to the mode of analysis. This is 
were the insights of the previous section enter. Even if there exists a positive 
contract zone (that is even if there exist equilibria which imply agreement) 
may there exist (pure strategy) equilibria which imply disagreement. This was 
the content of properties 5 and 6. The statement that "the existence of a 
contract zone is necessary, but not sufficient, for arbitration to lead to a 
voluntary settlement" is therefore correct with respect to the model in this 





























































































The reasons Bloom [1981] and Bloom and Cavanagh [1987] give are not 
necessary for this to occur in the above model. First, the reference to 
coordination problems (arising due to mixing or problems of common 
knowledge) is not at all necessary since properties 5 and 6 proved that there 
may be equilibria which imply disagreement even if there exist equilibria 
which imply agreement. Calling in an arbitrator is therefore independent of 
whether a contract zone exists, i.e. whether there exist equilibria which imply 
agreement. Second, substantial costs of negotiation do not enter in the above 
analysis and should have no effect on the final offers. Substantial costs of 
arbitration do however enter and partially define the set of equilibria, 
including the contract zone. Yet, even if there exist substantial costs to 
disagreement may there exist equilibria which imply disagreement (and this 
even if beliefs are identical). This can be seen in the following example:
Let C={0;1 ;2) and (Cau,Caf)=(l;l), that is, the union and the firm have 




(2 ;  0) S ( i ; i ) S ( i ;D
(15;
;0.5)
< i ; i) S(i;i)





As can be see from inspecting the payoffs in figure 1 both (1;1) and (0;2) are 
pure strategy equilibria. Hence, even though beliefs about the arbitrator's true 
preferences are identical, calling in an arbitrator constitutes equilibrium 
action, and this even for substantial direct costs of disagreement. That this can 
occur is not particular to the example chosen; however in games with bigger 
strategy spaces these situations can generally not arise for all 6s.
With respect to this model it is therefore not enough to calibrate a 
contract zone and then to check whether agents ended up agreeing. In this 




























































































expectations (leaving aside Bloom's point about coordination problems). The 
validity of this testing approach then boils down to whether agents are 
expected to have overly pessimistic expectations. However as will be 
explained in the next section, the answer to this question has often been mixed 
up in debates on the size and existence of a contract zone.
4. Reevaluating the Divergent Expectations 
Hypothesis
The results of this model have their greatest impact on Farber's model 
and the testing methodology that followed it if expectations about the 
arbitrator are either identical or overly optimistic. The question of whether 
and to what extent agents have divergent expectations is therefore of some 
importance. Arguments for and against the divergent expectations hypothesis 
have been supplied on two very different levels. On the one side the debate 
was carried out on a more or less empirical/experimental level; on the other 
side arguments of a more 'theoretical' nature were employed. Let me discuss 
the empirical/ experimental evidence first.
4.1. Empirical Evidence
There exists little direct evidence on the divergent expectations hypothesis. 
Bazerman and Neale [1982] asked subjects in a bargaining experiment with 
what probability they expect that their final offer will be accepted. The 
average probability estimate was 68%. This is therefore evidence in favour of 
the divergent expectations hypothesis and thus, within the context of the model 
of this paper, might mean that there may be multiple equilibria some of which 
imply agreement and some of which imply an arbitrated solution. Bazerman 
and Neale [1982] and Babcock and Olson [1992] also cite other, less relevant 
or direct, experimental evidence form the psychology literature which could 
also be interpreted as implying support for the divergent expectations 
hypothesis.
Babcock and Olson [1992] use a proxy to derive the parties' beliefs 
about arbitration and then use the equilibrium conditions to derive the contract 
zone. They then claim that the divergent expectations hypothesis requires 
evidence that settlements were negotiated when a positive contract zone existed 




























































































contract zone existed. A result they then derive is that 86% of the parties who 
received final offer awards had an estimated positive contract zone (and that 
only 14% of the parties who received final offer awards had negative contract 
zones). Naturally they therefore reject the divergent expectation hypothesis. 
Their concern that "this indicates that even when the parties could conceivably 
settle voluntarily, they often choose to receive a final offer award" (page 356) 
points directly to the model of this paper. The finding that 86% of the parties 
who received final offer awards had an estimated positive contract zone (and 
should therefore, according to the standard theory, have negotiated a 
settlement without referring to an arbitrator) can be interpreted as evidence 
for the model of this paper since the existence of a contract zone need not 
imply that disagreement can not also be equilibrium action. Furthermore, this 
ambiguity in equilibria can only arise in my model if expectations about the 
arbitrator are on the whole divergent and if there are furthermore costs to 
disagreement. It would therefore appear that the parties who go to final offer 
arbitration on the whole have divergent expectations. Hence, when 
interpreting the evidence of Babcock and Olsen in the context of the model of 
this paper their results start to make sense and their conclusion that the 
evidence is unfavourable to the divergent expatiations hypothesis is 
furthermore turned on its head. This is rather intriguing.
Farber and Bazerman [1989] test for the 'sufficiency' of divergent 
expectations (after arguing that they are 'necessary') by comparing identical 
expectation contract zones10 under final offer arbitration and under 
conventional arbitration. They argue that identical expectations contract zones 
"will be larger under the form of arbitration that leads to the higher 
settlement rate" (page 101). The reason they give is that larger identical 
expectations contract zones will be more likely to lead to agreement in actual 
cases where expectations may well differ (because in these cases contract zones 
would otherwise not exist). The authors therefore claim that if final offer 
arbitration leads to fewer disagreements than conventional arbitration it 
should also imply larger identical expectations contract zones. The authors cite 
evidence that final offer arbitration leads to more settlements than 
conventional arbitration. Since the authors find however that identical
10 A contract zone is the range of agreements that both parties prefer to 
disagreement. The identical expectations contract zone is the contract zone 





























































































expectations contract zones are larger under conventional arbitration than 
under final offer arbitration they have to reject the hypothesis that divergent 
beliefs are 'sufficient' to explain disagreement. (As a matter of fact, on these 
grounds they also reject an asymmetric information hypothesis). Ashenfelter 
et al. [1992] find, however, that the dispute rate in a final offer arbitration 
system is at least as high as the dispute rate in a comparable conventional 
arbitration system; this would imply that the 'sufficiency hypothesis' might 
actually go through.
The test of Farber and Bazerman can be criticised on several grounds. 
First, it presumes that divergent beliefs have the same effect under both 
conventional and final offer arbitration. Since the authors have no equilibrium 
theory of divergent beliefs this assumption is ad hoc. Second, it presumes that 
larger contract zones lead to less disagreement. This hypothesis is for example 
contested in Bloom [1981] and Bloom and Cavanagh [1987]. It also implies 
that a positive contract zone leads to agreement, a conclusion that can not be 
drawn in the context of my model.
To summarise, the scarce empirical and experimental evidence that 
exists although partially contradictory is on the whole favourable to the 
divergent expectations hypothesis and to the relevance of the model of this 
paper. However more experimental and empirical evidence is clearly 
required.
4.2. Arguments of a more theoretical nature
Evidence which could be interpreted as being unfavourable to the divergent 
expectations explanation comes from the 'arbitrator exchangeability' 
hypothesis. This hypothesis, which has been confirmed in several studies, 
states that arbitrators operate within a process that makes them statistically 
exchangeable (see for example Ashenfelter et al [1992], Ashenfelter [1987], 
Bloom and Cavanagh [1987] and Farber and Bazerman [1986]). In Ashenfelter 
et al [1992] this hypothesis for example takes the following form:
"... exchangeability requires that there be no predictable differences.
... Statistical exchangeability of arbitrators implies that the arbitrator 
decision may be modelled as being based on random draws from a 
fixed distribution,..." (page 1048)
The fixed distribution is of course taken to be the same for both agents. From 




























































































about the arbitrator's settlement, i.e. they should hold mean expectations from 
some objective distribution. Such a conclusion can be contested on several 
grounds. Arbitrators have to be approved by both parties (see Bloom and 
Cavanagh [1986] and [1987] for a review of arbitrator selection mechanisms). 
It is therefore likely that an arbitrator is chosen from which both agents 
expect to receive a favourable outcome. One of the agents must in this case 
end up disappointed; however, this is inevitable and the direct consequence of 
selecting an arbitrator.
Arbitrators earn fees from arbitration (like lawyers). It therefore is in 
their interest to be called to settle a dispute, and thus to create expectations 
which please both11. Divergent expectations do allow the arbitrator to be 
'statistically exchangeable' since the arbitrator can ex post still act in a 
statistically exchangeable way. The reason is that the underlying preferences 
of the arbitrator and the beliefs about them are not observable. Nurturing 
divergent expectations does therefore not need to damage the reputation of an 
arbitrator as long as he or she fosters divergent expectations in not too 
obvious a way. Arbitrators for which this becomes too obvious are substituted. 
Hence once agents 'learn' that their expectations were wrong (it can take a 
long time for this to occur) then a new arbitrator enters who starts the game 
anew.
A second class of arguments made against the divergent expectations 
hypothesis concerns the human capability to learn12. Such learning arguments 
were generally made in a rather informal way. Farber and Katz [1979] for 
example dismiss divergent expectations as a satisfactory explanation since they 
consider that:
" It is reasonable to believe that over time the parties learn about the 
arbitrator's behaviour both through their own experience and, 
indirectly, through the experience of others" (page 59)
n Such a view is not incompatible with the standard one advanced by Farber 
and Bazerman [1986]: "...one possible motivation for arbitrators is that they 
attempt to make awards that maximise the probability they will be hired in 
subsequent cases, either by the same parties or by others who are aware of 
their performance." (page 1506).
12 I do not here refer to models like that of Gibbons [1988] were agents update 
their knowledge about some underlying and relevant piece of information via 




























































































From this they then conclude that 'learning' will imply that the means and 
variances of the negotiators' prior distributions will converge over time. This 
might or might not be the case depending on how one models 'learning'. 
There have however also been slightly more formal arguments which invoke 
'agreeing to disagree' type results (see Aumann [1976] and Fudenberg and 
Tirole [1991]). Crawford [1985] and Bloom and Cavanagh [1987] interpreted 
Farber [1980] as stating that divergent beliefs are to be modelled via common 
priors and private information. Crawford then claimed that to model 
divergent beliefs via common priors and private information does not work 
since 'no trade theorems'13 as in Milgrom and Stockey [1982] apply14. 
However, such appeals to 'agree to disagree' results, even if they could be 
shown to be correct and relevant, neither apply to the model of Olson and 
Babcock [1992] nor do they apply to mine since in both models agents have 
divergent priors..
Finally, there is the view that, ultimately, what are believed to be 
differences in beliefs are differences in private information. (Kennan and 
Wilson's [1993] attack on the divergent expectations hypothesis is a case in 
point15.) Debating such a view is not different than to argue about what came
13 No trade theorems are closely related to 'agreeing to disagree' results as in 
Aumann [1976]- see Fudenberg and Tirole [1991]
14 There is however some evidence that Crawford was confused about this 
issue (or at least he expressed his ideas very badly), for in Crawford [1982, 
page 72] he states that "... the bargainers' priors about the arbitrators 
preferences are common knowledge (and therefore identical by Aumann's 
(1976) result)..." Of course Aumann's result says nothing of the sort. 
Aumann's result requires that the players' beliefs be derived by Bayesian 
updating from the common prior distribution he assumes. Then, once the 
information partitioning and the posteriors are common knowledge, then 
posteriors have to be identical. (See Aumann's article or Fudenberg and Tirole 
[1991]). Also Bloom and Cavanagh [1987, page 354] seem to follow such a 
line since they state that "... bargainers will tend to reconcile their prior 
expectations about an arbitrator's behaviour in the negotiations leading up to 
the arbitration (see for example Geanakopolos and Polemarchakis [1982])". 
The article of Geanakopolos and Polemarchakis proves an Aumann type 
result, however, which requires common priors.
15 "We favour the third criticism, however, which is that divergent 
expectations are predicted and explained by private information- and found to 




























































































first, the chicken or the egg? In the end such arguments just describe 
modelling preferences16.
5. Conclusions
This paper presented a model of final offer arbitration slightly different 
(and possibly slightly more realistic) to the standard Farber [1980] model. The 
small difference in modelling did however yield important advantages and 
new insights. First it allowed one to consider the consequences of the direct 
costs of arbitration on the final offers, something that has been neglected in 
the literature. Second, the model of this paper fully characterised the set of 
equilibrium offers and described a class of cases for which the set of equilibria 
can consist of both (pure strategy) agreement and (pure strategy) disagreement 
equilibria. This showed that the concepts of a 'positive' and 'negative' contract 
zones are not mutually exclusive, as was generally presumed in the literature. 
These new insights are then used in order to reconsider a debate of whether 
the existence of a positive contract zone is sufficient for agents to agree.
Since the model is driven by divergent beliefs the question of when and 
whether agents have divergent beliefs is of some importance. This paper used 
the opportunity to partially reevaluate the debate (and the evidence supporting 
it) in the light of the model of this paper. My conclusion was that the 
experimental and empirical evidence on the topic, although still scarce, is on 
the whole rather favourable to the divergent beliefs hypothesis. The 
theoretical arguments on the topic are on the whole unconvincing. This then 
suggests that the theory in this paper might be useful in understanding 
arbitration.
Appendix
This appendix fully characterises the set of equilibria. Remember that Q u is 
U's final offer of what F gets and Q f denotes what F asks for itself. A way of 
describing the offers of interest, leaving the diagonal pairs Q u=Qf aside for a





























































































moment, is by way of the following sets (which were already used in several 





These sets are either empty or contain one element- the offer of interest. It can 
be seen that the sets Cmin(Cau,Cjf*) and Cmax(Caf,Cju*) would always be empty 
if the strategy space were continuous. This problem would remain if, for 
example, the arbitrator had a rule which gave everything to U and nothing to 
F in the case in which U and F made offers equally far away from CX
The set of matching final offers (Q u*,Cjf*) define equilibrium offers 
unless:
Cmin(Cau!Cif*)^0 and 6(jr-Cpu)>(ji-Ciu) where CpaeO i"(C aa,Cjf*) 
or O q (O ,C if*)*0 and 6(n-V2(Cpu+C,f*))>(n-Clu*) whereCpaeC>q(C>,Cjf*) 
and unless
Oax(Cat,qa*)*0 and 6Cpf>C,f* where C pfeO ^C ^C ,-*) 
or Ceq(Caf,Ciu*)x0 and 6V2(Cpf+Ciu*)>Cif* where CpfGC^(Caf,Cia*)
where 0 a(0 ,C jf* ), O ax(Caf,Ci“*), O t ( 0 ,Q f * )  and C<=q(Caf,Cia*) were 
defined above. Note that there might not exist Cpu and Cpf which satisfy the 
maximising, minimising and equality problems which constrain the deviations 
from equilibrium. In these cases (Ciu*,Qf*) is an equilibrium since all other 
deviations lead to lower expected payoffs. The reason why always two 
conditions for each player are required is that the equal distance case in the 
arbitration rule introduces an extra possibility which has to be considered 
(which however becomes irrelevant once beliefs are incompatible- see the 
arguments in the proofs of properties 3 and 4). For this reason it is also 
slightly more cumbersome to define the set of equilibrium offers which imply 
disagreement.
For any pair (Q u*,Cjf*), where Q “*<Cjf*, to satisfy Q u*£Cmin(Cau,Cjf*) 
and Cjf*ECmax(Caf,Cju*) it must be the case that Caf>Cau for otherwise it cannot 




























































































for (Cju*,C/*), where Cju*<Cjf*, to satisfy [Cju* £ C min(Cau,Cjf*) and 
Cjf*GCeq(Caf,Ci“*)] and [Cjf*eO"a*(Caf,Cia*) and CjU*eCeq(Ca“,Cjf*)]. On the 
other hand for any such pair to satisfy Cju* £ C eq(Cau,C jf*) and 
Cjf*£Ceq(Caf,Cju*) it must be the case that Caf=Cau for otherwise it cannot be 
the case that Cau=V2(Cjf*+Cju*)=Caf. Remember that the strategy space was
assumed to be C={Co, — ,Ck}={l:l=0,l,2_,k} which implies that if Cju*=Cj_if*
then 1/2(Cjf* + C;_2u)=Cj_iu*. For Q u* = Cj.|f* where 1>2 it follows that 
V2(Cjf*+Ci.,u*)<Cj.iu*. This implies that an element of Cmin(Cau,Cjf*) (or 
Cmax(Caf,Cju*)), should one exist, can never yield a lower payoff than an 
element of Ceq(Cau,Cjf*) and (or Ceq(Caf,Cju*)), should one exist. The pair 
(Cju*,Cjf*), where Cju*<Cjf*, are equilibrium offers if
Caf>Cau
and if 8(jr-Ciu*)2=(jt-Cjf*) where C ia*£C"'in(Cau,Cjf*) 
and if 8Cjf*aCi“* where Cjf*£Cmax(Caf,Cia*)
or if
6(jt-Qu*);>(ji-Cjf*) where Cia*GC™n(Caa,Cjf*) 
and if Ceq(Caf,Ciu*)^0 then 5V2(Cjf*+Ci“*);»Ciu*
and if 8,/2(Cjf*+Ciu*)a8(jr-Cj_if) where Cjf*GOq(Caf,Ciu*)
or if
C«=q(Caa,Qf*)^0 and 6(jr-V2(Qa*+Cjf*))a(ji-Cjf*) 
and if 8(rt-V2(Ciu*+Cjf*));>6Ci+,a where C,u*GOq(Caa,C,f'*)
and if 5Cjf*2iCiu* where Cjf*eC'"a’‘(Caf,Cia*)
or if O t C 3»
and if 8(Ji-l/2(Ciu*+Cjf*))2 (ir-Cjf*) where Q ’*eC“i(Caa,C/*)
and if 8V2(Cjf*+Ciu*)aCiu* where C/*£Qq(Caf,C;u*)
where Cm'n(Cau,Cjf*), Cmax(Car,Cju*), Ceq(Cau,Cjf*) and Ceq(Caf,Cju*) were 
defined above.
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